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Introduction1
One of John Donne’s immortal line is “No man is an island, entire of itself’.2 Like any 
phrase or sentence in literature, there can be many interpretations of it. To me, Donne 
was clearly saying that we human beings are interdependent and cannot live in some 
state of hermetic isolation.
History has proved Donne correct whether one looks to economic, political, social, 
or legal developments for support. In many ways, evolving global communications 
technology reflects both support for Donne’s thesis and a challenge to it on which I 
wish to elaborate in discussing two of our most prized values: freedom of speech and 
privacy.
My choosing these values is not accidental but deliberate. My close friend, the 
Honourable John Sopinka, passed away a year ago on November 24th, 1997. On 
November 26th, 1994, John gave a speech on “Freedom of Information and Privacy in 
the Information Age”, which he subsequently updated at Queen’s University on 
November 26th, 1996 and in Calgary on September 15th, 1997, just two months before 
he died.
My comments today are an updating of John’s remarks. But my main purpose in 
making these comments is to pay tribute to the life of a superb lawyer and judge whose 
“man for all seasons qualities” were taken from us far too soon and will not likely be 
replaced.
* Supreme Court of Canada. This is the text of a speech given at the Information Technology 
Law Conference in Toronto, October, 1998.
1 I should like to express my thanks for the invaluable assistance of my law clerk, Wendy A. 
Adams, in the preparation of these remarks.
2 Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions (1624), Meditation XVII: Nunc lento sonitu dicunt, 
Morieris.
Freedom of Speech
Freedom of speech was established as an international human right, if only in 
aspirational terms, in 1948 with the proclamation by the United Nations of the 
Universal Declaration o f Human Rights? Since the inclusion of freedom of speech as 
a fundamental civil right within the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,4 freedom of speech has arguably reached the level of an international norm. 
Domestically, freedom of speech is given explicit protection in most constitutional 
democracies, including Canada and the United States. However, in both the domestic 
and international contexts, as with other fundamental rights, sufficient flexibility exists 
for governments and courts to subject individual freedom of speech to such limitations 
as are thought necessary in democratic society to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others.
Accordingly, the permissible limitations on freedom of speech is a familiar issue 
in most legal systems. Legislatures and courts are faced with the difficult task of 
attempting to balance competing interests, namely the right to free expression, and the 
right not to be exposed to harmful or degrading expression which threatens inherent 
human dignity and equality. The advent of global communications technology, 
however, with its capacity for instantaneous dissemination of virtually unlimited 
amounts of information to a potentially universal audience, poses new challenges which 
threaten to disrupt the delicate balance that has been achieved to date in domestic legal 
systems.
The Internet, as the most visible structure of international communications 
technology, has fundamentally altered methods of accessing and disseminating 
information, with profound social, political and legal implications. Designed to support 
individual, autonomous access to a vast store of online information, the Internet 
provides global communications on a scale that previously could be achieved only by 
governments, businesses and organisations with sufficient resources to invest in the 
necessary infrastructure. Through a combination of public and private funding, the 
Internet puts worldwide communications within the reach of anyone who has access to 
a personal computer. It should not be forgotten, however, that in a world where only 
half the population has access to such fundamental technology as a telephone, 
increasing reliance on the Internet as a vehicle for information exchange and commerce 
by Western industrialised countries threatens to result in technological colonialism as 
developing countries remain isolated by their lack of access to technology.
3 UNGA Res. 21 (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, UN Doc. A/810 ( 1948), adopted 
by vote 48-0, with 8 abstentions.
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 
47 (entered into force 23 March 1976; in Canada, 19 August 1976).
It is also necessary to come to terms with the essential and alarming paradox of this 
new communications technology. Decentralisation, which is the most important design 
feature of the Internet, has the potential to contribute significantly to the process of 
participatory democracy and the protection of human rights by expanding unrestricted 
access to information. The decentralised nature of the Internet, however, also has the 
potential to render superfluous government regulations and controls on either content 
or access which are considered desirable. While technological circumvention of 
domestic control allows citizens of authoritarian regimes an unheralded level of access 
to information and freedom of speech, it also renders democratic governments 
powerless in many ways to address the social harms of unlimited speech in the same 
manner as similar communications in other media.
The international political economy of information and technology reflects both the 
significance of economic development and social and political ideology in the diversity 
of regulatory approaches adopted to accommodate the challenges of global 
communications and commerce within existing legal institutions. One of the most 
significant distinctions underlying social and cultural values is the manner in which the 
persistent tension between liberty and equality is reconciled in terms of the limitations 
which are placed upon freedom of speech. While access to Internet communications 
technology and the accompanying dissemination of information is overwhelmingly 
concentrated in Western countries, particularly the United States, the relative 
homogeneity of political and cultural values does not equate to a uniform approach in 
balancing the rights of freedom of speech and protection from harm. At times, this 
cultural and legal diversity leads to interjurisdictional conflict as governments attempt 
to regulate access to and dissemination of information originating beyond their own 
territorial borders.
Balancing Freedom o f Speech and Protection from Harm in an International 
Communications Environment
In many Western democracies, an acknowledged concern is that unlimited freedom of 
expression may result in exposure to harmful or degrading speech in a manner which 
abrogates or derogates from constitutional guarantees of equality. The United States 
and Canada, despite their analogous legal systems, represent in many ways two 
distinctly different ideologies in addressing this concern. The reasons for these 
differences are fascinating but beyond the scope of these remarks.
Both the Canadian and U.S. Constitutions enshrine and protect freedom of speech 
as a fundamental value which is essential to the proper functioning of a free and 
democratic society. Both Constitutions as well protect and promote basic equality as 
an inherent human right, essential to the dignity of all persons. Within the Canadian 
legal system, however, when these two values conflict in circumstances where freedom 
of speech threatens or results in harm to others, such speech is curtailed in order that
equality may prevail. Within the U.S. legal system, a limitation on freedom of speech 
in the name of equality is a solution which exists far beyond the doctrinal horizon. For 
the sake of discussion, I will refer to the Canadian approach as relativist and the U.S. 
as absolutist.5
Canadian courts have addressed the conflict between freedom of speech and 
protection from harm in two areas which are particularly amenable to global access and 
dissemination through Internet technology: pornography and hate speech. In R v. 
Butler,6 the Supreme Court of Canada was required to balance the public interest in the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which extends even to obscene 
expression against an equally compelling public interest in protection from the harm 
that would result from exposure to such materials. The accused was a video store owner 
who was charged with selling obscene material contrary to the relevant provisions of 
the Criminal Code prohibiting the “undue exploitation of sex”.7 Through the pen of Mr. 
Justice Sopinka, the Court found the materials to be protected by section 2(b) of the 
Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees freedom of thought, 
belief, opinion and expression as fundamental freedoms.8 Nonetheless, the Court 
concluded that the criminalisation of expression amounting to the “undue exploitation 
of sex” was a reasonable limit upon the right to freedom of speech, in accordance with 
section 1 of the Charter, as demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. The 
Court recognised that materials which unduly exploit sex in a “degrading or 
dehumanising” manner may be prohibited on the basis that they are harmful to society 
in general and to the equality interest of women in particular.
In R. v. Keegstra,9 he Court addressed a similar conflict between an individual’s 
guarantee of freedom of speech and the public’s right to be protected from harm. The 
accused, an Alberta high school teacher, was charged under the relevant provision of 
the Criminal Code with willfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group by 
communicating anti-Semitic statements to his students.10 The Court concluded that hate
5 That the U. S. approach is characterised as absolutist for the purposes of comparison is not meant 
to suggest that U.S. constitutional law does not contain qualifications or limitations upon the First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech. For example, speech which represents a “clear and 
present danger” in the form of inciting or producing imminent lawless action (Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 ( 1969)), or in the form of fighting words (Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 697 
(1974)) is not constitutionally protected from state regulation.
6 R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452.
7 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 163.
8 Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 2(b).
9R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
speech is protected under section 2(b) of the Charter, but as with the circumstances 
occurring in Butler, this freedom is not absolute, particularly when the guarantee comes 
into conflict with other constitutional rights. The Court held that the relevant Criminal 
Code provisions constituted a reasonable limit upon freedom of expression in that 
protection from the harm flowing from hate propaganda which interferes with the basic 
human dignity and equality of targeted minority groups is an objective of sufficient 
importance to warrant overriding a competing constitutional guarantee.
Both of these cases dealt with limitations on speech produced and disseminated in 
traditional media. The challenge of addressing issues of pornography and hate speech 
in the context of the Internet is not that the nature of the expression itself has changed, 
or that the constitutional balance achieved between freedom and equality requires 
alteration. The Internet’s definitive feature, its potentially unlimited capacity for access 
and dissemination, increases the magnitude of both the risk and the resultant harm from 
pornographic or hateful materials. The most serious challenge to domestic legal 
systems posed by the Internet is that this decentralised infrastructure requires universal 
enforcement in a world where domestic authority typically stops at the border. 
Legislatures and courts will be presented with troubling issues of jurisdiction in their 
efforts to impose domestic limitations upon speech which is essentially global in nature.
States which vary between absolutist and relativist in their approach to the right to 
freedom of speech will inevitably face both legal and technological conflicts where 
information that is perfectly legal in one jurisdiction can be accessed by those in a 
jurisdiction which prohibits such information. Early in 1996, a German prosecutor 
informed CompuServe, an American online services company with clients throughout 
the world, that allowing its German subscribers access to sexually explicit information 
would violate German law. Faced with growing competition in Europe in the provision 
of online services, CompuServe felt it had no choice but to block subscribers’ access 
to the targeted information. The potential futility of national enforcement, however, is 
demonstrated by the fact that the same information could still be viewed computer users 
in Germany who had direct access to the decentralised Internet and did not need to rely 
on the gateway services provided by CompuServe. An additional complication is that 
it is generally not possible for Internet service providers to limit access with sufficient 
precision such that only prohibited material is denied. When Deutsche Telekom, a 
service provider for more than one million Germans, blocked access to a website based 
in California carrying the views of Toronto-based Holocaust denier Ernst Zundel, 
technical limitations forced it to block access simultaneously to all information 
originating from the same service provider.
These examples illustrate an important political and legal issue in terms of whether 
the United States, as a dominant Internet stakeholder, will be able to export successfully 
its libertarian and free-market ideological approach to Internet regulation to other 
countries, such as Canada, which currently adopt a different social welfare calculus. 
Both the “virtual export” and “involuntary import” of global communications results
from the decentralised nature of Internet communications: a decentralised network can 
adapt to local prohibitions by providing access from extraterritorial sites. Tfee inability 
of domestic governments to regulate external sites could result in a de facto 
international regulatory regime established at the level of the lowest net regulatory 
burden.
An international defamation lawsuit that would have tested whether the absolutist 
American approach to free expression could prevail on the global Internet was recently 
settled by the parties involved. Dr. Laurence Godfrey, a British lecturer in physics and 
computer sciences, sued Cornell University and one of its former graduate students, 
.Michael Dolenga, in the High Court in London, claiming that defamatory messages 
were posted on the Internet by the student.11 Had the suit succeeded, the American 
Internet service provider and private individuals involved would have been held 
accountable not to their own domestic standards of free expression, but to the more 
rigorous approach of English libel law. On the other hand, had the suit failed, the result 
would be that England would be powerless to protect its citizens from what it views as 
the harmful effects of defamatory speech, disseminated not only in England but also 
available worldwide.
Resort to Methods o f Prior Restraint
Faced with public demands to address the availability of unrestricted harmful speech 
on the Internet and the difficulty of enforcing national laws, governments are beginning 
to resort to technological rather than legal solutions, such as filtering software. Filtering 
software screens and limits material available on the Internet by blocking access to 
information based on a list of prohibited keywords contained in the software’s database. 
This technology is presented as a viable alternative to overly broad governmental 
regulation, but the implementation of such forms of prior restraint is far from 
unproblematic. Existing filtration programs are blunt instruments of censorship, 
incapable of making contextual judgements as to content of information. For example, 
the inclusion of keywords with sexual connotations is ostensibly justified as a method 
of protecting children from sexually explicit materials available online, but the censored 
keywords also block access to sites with socially desirable information such as breast 
cancer research, assistance for victims of sexual abuse, and public health information 
relating to HIV and AIDS. Filtration software is also notorious for blocking access to 
lesbian and gay information services, notwithstanding that the censored sites contain no
11 Carl S. Kaplan, “Suit Against Cornell Dropped in International Libel Case” The New York 
Times (6 November 1998). Professor Godfrey is apparently proceeding, however,With a 
defamation law suit against an Internet service provider canying on business in England and 
Wales; see Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd., [1999] E.W.J. No. 1226 (H.C.J.).
sexually explicit material, but simply provide information, education, resources and 
calendars of events.
The United States, with its absolutist approach to freedom of speech, is oddly 
enough the site of recent controversies wherein censorship of online information has 
been initiated by the state. In February 1996, a coalition of groups led by the American 
Civil Liberties Union filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of the federal 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (the “CDA”).12 The CDA contained censorship 
provisions aimed at protecting minors by criminalising the “knowing” transmission of 
“obscene or indecent” messages through the Internet to any recipient under 18 years of 
age. In Reno v.ACLU,n the Supreme Court of the United States found the provisions 
to be an impermissibly vague limitation on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
speech, and further that a ban on transmitting indecent materials to minors also posed 
an unacceptable risk that socially valuable speech, such as information about birth 
control, sexuality and AIDS, would be restricted as well. The Court held that while 
Congress has a legitimate interest in protecting children from harmful materials, this 
interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to 
adults. A second challenge was recently filed in response to the subsequent 
Congressional attempt at online censorship, the Child Online Protection Act, which 
makes it a federal crime to “knowingly” communicate “for commercial purposes” 
material considered “harmful to minors”.14 On November 19th, a federal court in 
Philadelphia issued a temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of the Act.'5
Following the failure of the CDA, the United States Congress and various funded 
agencies have attempted to achieve similar results through indirect means. Congress 
has sought to condition the receipt by schools of federal funds on the installation of 
filtering software on computers available to students.16 Libraries, under pressure from 
local boards, have begun to install filtering software on public access terminals available 
to library patrons. By installing technical means of prior restraint on library Internet 
terminals, however, public libraries may be engaging in an unconstitutional violation
12 47 U.S.C. §223 (1996).
13 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
14 47 U.S.C. §231 (a)( 1)( 1998).
15 Order by United States District Judge Lowell A. Reed, Jr., in ACLUv. Reno, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Civil Action No. 98-5591, November 
19th, 1998.
16 See for example the Children’s Internet Protection Act, S. 1619, a bill introduced on February 
9,1999, by Senate Commerce Committee Chair John McCain, (R-AZ), and approved by the 
Committee March 12, 1999. The proposed legislation would deny eligibility for 
telecommunications discounts authorized by the Snowe-Rockefeller provision of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 to schools and libraries that do not certify the use of a filtering 
or software filtering system.
of their patron’s freedom of speech. In December 1997, a grassroots organisation filed 
a federal lawsuit in an attempt to stop Internet usage policy of the public library system 
of Loudoun County, Virginia. The policy required that filtering software designed to 
block access to pornographic sites be installed on all public access Internet terminals in 
the library system.17 The threat of prior restraint has become so pronounced that the 
American Library Association felt compelled to issue an official statement of its 
position that filtering software blocks information which is protected in the United- 
States by the First Amendments guarantee of freedom of speech, and is inimical to the 
basic function of libraries to provide public access to information.18
Freedom o f Speech as a Fundamental Human Right in Context
In Western countries, our understanding of issues relating to freedom of speech on the 
Internet tends to focus on those concerns with which we are most familiar. We are 
fairly sophisticated in our appreciation of the tension between unlimited freedom of 
speech and the need to protect ourselves from the harmful effects of unrestricted 
pornography or hate speech. We may differ among societies, and even within societies, 
on the proper balance that legislatures and courts should attempt to achieve between the 
competing fundamental values that are engaged. In most Western democracies, 
however, we are fortunate to live in political systems that permit us the luxury of debate 
as to the degree of limitation which should be allowed; we need not advocate in peril 
for our right to freedom of speech itself. The same cannot be said of every other 
country.
As Western societies begin to cooperate to address the legal issues posed by global, 
unrestricted access to and dissemination of information on the Internet, we should be 
mindful that the international regulatory regimes and precedents we establish must 
protect not only the delicate balance between free speech and protection from harm in 
Western societies, but should also promote and protect an entitlement to free speech for 
those living under more repressive and authoritarian regimes. We need to proceed with 
caution and appreciate the necessity of a truly international perspective in dealing with 
an international communications medium. Without such a perspective, the potential 
exists that Western democracies, as the current dominant stakeholders of the Internet 
community, will establish domestic and international regulatory controls which achieve 
the objectives of our own domestic welfare calculus while simultaneously providing 
authoritarian regimes with the technical and legal precedents of online oppression.
17 Carl S. Kaplan, “In Library Filtering Case, an Unusual Ally” The New York Times (2 October 
1998).
18 Statement of the American Library Association to the Senate Commerce, Science and 
Transportation Committee on Indecency on the internet, Hearing Record, February 10, 1998. 
Available on the Internet at the Association’^  website at http://www.ala.org/washofï/mccain.html.
Unless we can be confident that regulatory controls are sufficiently contextualised, we 
should be aware that the same tools, whether doctrinal or technical, which protect us 
from harm can be used indiscriminately to withhold access from others.
Privacy
The Implications for Privacy o f Global Access and Dissemination o f Information
A right to privacy is recognised as a fundamental human right in all major international 
treaties and agreements on human rights. Nearly every written constitution also 
recognises privacy as a fundamental human right, either explicitly or implicitly. In both 
Canada and the United States, constitutional protection of an individual right to privacy 
has generally taken the form of restricting undue state interference with either 
behavioural privacy or the right of citizens to personal autonomy in making personal 
decisions and fundamental life choices. The increasing volume of personal information 
being collected by both governments and private commercial interests, however, along 
with the emergence of the Internet as a vehicle for worldwide communications and 
commerce, has shifted the focus of concern from behavioural to informational privacy, 
the latter being understood as the ability to control the collection and use of personal 
and intimate details of one’s identity and life. New technology, particularly in the 
private sector, is beginning to erode this right of privacy, and neither domestic nor 
international law has kept pace with these developments.
Canadians perhaps initially considered the impact of wide-scale computerised 
record-keeping on individual privacy rights when the federal government adopted the 
social insurance number. We were assured that the number was not intended as a form 
of universal identification, and were instructed that we were legally required to submit 
our social insurance number for employment purposes only. The convenience of this 
unique identifier, however, was difficult for both governments and commercial 
organisations to resist. It appears that lack of awareness as to the implications has led 
to the current state of affairs whereby Canadians regularly provide their social insurance 
number on a wide variety of application forms such as licenses, video store 
memberships and credit cards.
While both federal and provincial governments in Canada have enacted legislation 
that places strict controls on the collection and use of personal information by the state, 
the private sector has been left largely unregulated. Prior to the advent of networked 
communications technology, the threat to privacy posed by commercial interests was 
relatively benign. The combination of mergers and acquisitions in the financial sector, 
however, along with technological developments which permit large, distributed 
databases to exchange information, has resulted in an increasing consolidation of 
personal information. More information is being collected than ever before, and is 
being aggregated and widely disseminated to a degree of which most Canadians are 
unaware. The collection of personal information, when confined to specific uses and
isolated within individual databases, poses relatively little threat to individual privacy. 
When communications technology permits this information to be consolidated, 
however, the result is a gradual buildup of intrusive personal profiles by private sector 
actors who remain largely unregulated.
Increasing use of the Internet also poses a serious threat to individual privacy, not 
simply owing to a lack of regulation in the private sector, but also because most users 
are unaware of the information that is collected during online sessions. A standard 
request for a World Wide Web document provides the name of the computer associated 
with the requester, the date and time of the request, the name and location of the 
requested file, and the last site the requester visited. Some websites also transfer 
information to the hard drive of the person viewing the site in a file known as a 
“cookie”. Upon subsequent visits, this information on the requester’s hard drive can 
be viewed and modified by the operator of the website. In effect, a cookie functions as 
a passport issued by the website to each requester, which is viewed and stamped on 
subsequent visits. The cookie, or passport, typically contains a history of all of the 
Internet sites the user has accessed. Cookies were originally designed for the technical 
purpose of facilitating interaction between websites and viewers by providing website 
owners with the information necessary to increase the efficiency of website operations. 
Corporate website owners soon realised, however, that cookies could also be used to 
provide personal information concerning vistors ’ consumer habits, allowing companies 
to build a profile on each potential customer for marketing purposes.
The legal regulation of access to personal information, with its emphasis in both 
Canada and the United States on the public sector, has not kept pace with the increasing 
threat of privacy posed by online technology such as the Internet. Individuals have a 
dangerously naïve sense of privacy when they use these communications technologies, 
perhaps because access is conducted in the relatively anonymous environment of 
interaction between an individual”s own personal computer and an unseen, faceless 
communications server.
The vulnerability of personal privacy in this ostensibly anonymous environment 
was recently demonstrated in a situation involving the United States Navy’s attempt to 
dismiss a gay sailor. Homosexuality is grounds for discharge from the United States 
military, but the recently implemented “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy presumably protects 
servicemen and women by prohibiting them to reveal their sexual orientation, and by 
prohibiting the military from making inquiries. Senior Chief Petty Officer Timothy R. 
McVeigh, who is no relation to the Timothy McVeigh recently convicted of the 
Oklahoma City bombing, served as the top enlisted man aboard a U.S. Navy submarine. 
He was threatened with discharge from the Navy when it was discovered that his 
member profile for America Online, an online service provider, contained the word 
“gay”.
All America Online members are given “screen names” which identify them in 
online interactions without revealing their real identity. Each individual hasthe option 
of placing information about himself in a profile which members can use to identify 
other members of the online community with similar interests, hobbies or lifestyles. 
Timothy McVeigh identified himself in this profile as “Tim from Honolulu”, and in the 
category of marital status, had written “gay”. When Navy personnel contacted America 
Online and asked for the real identity of “Tim from Honolulu”, America Online 
provided Timothy McVeigh”s name from its customer records, despite its’ policy of 
protecting the privacy of its members. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(the “ECPA”), however, prohibits any federal government agency, including the Navy, 
from seeking, and online service providers like America Online from releasing, any 
personal information to the federal government in the absence of appropriate prior 
authorization such as a warrant.19 Accordingly, a federal court judge enjoined the 
dismissal of McVeigh after finding that the Naval investigators “likely” violated the 
ECPA when they requested and received the confidential subscriber information from 
America Online.20
The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench recently dealt with a similar situation in 
Canada in R. v. Weir.21 The accused was charged with possession of child pornography 
after his Internet service provider discovered an e-mail message containing pictures of 
children in sexual positions. The Internet service provider released this information to 
the police, who then obtained a warrant to search the accused”s residence. A computer 
and disks containing further pornographic pictures of children were subsequently 
seized. The accused argued that e-mail carries an expectation of privacy, and that the 
police had conducted a warrantless search and seizure by requesting and receiving 
access to the initial e-mail message without prior authorization. While the court found 
that e-mail did carry a reasonable expectation of privacy, this privacy was less than 
could be expected with first class mail. The court accordingly ruled that the evidence 
was admissible and then accused was convicted.
Private Sector Data Collection and "Creeping Surveillance ”
The potentially negative impact of communications technology on personal privacy 
derives not only from the increasing ease of global communications made possible by 
the Internet, but results as well from the manner in which networked communication 
permits wide-scale consolidation of the information contained in numerous databases 
in both the public and private sectors. In effect, the increased collection and 
consolidation of individual items of personal information results in a form of “creeping
19 18 U.S.C. §2701 etseq.
20 See McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 (Dist. D.C., 1998).
21R. v. Weir, [1998] A.J. No. 155 (Alta. Q.B.).
surveillance”. The implications of this surveillance by installment are of particular 
concern in commercial transactions, given the almost total lack of regulatory controls 
in the private sector with respect to the permissible extent of information that can be 
collected, and the uses that commercial organisations can make this information.
In the absence of privacy legislation, companies are able to consolidate a large 
amount of information not only by maintaining their own transaction history databases, 
but can also augment this information by purchasing transaction histories and the 
associated personal details from other companies. It is almost impossible to proceed 
through one”s daily routine in a manner which avoids collection of personal information 
that is added to these corporate databases. Automated teller machines record the time, 
date and location of every transaction. If you rely on a magnetic stripe pass to enter the 
office, your location is automatically recorded as you move through the building. Every 
purchase of goods or services charged to a credit card is available in a database to which 
the police, among others, have access. Surveillance cameras in banks, government 
buildings and convenience stores record you image. If you use a company health plan 
to purchase prescription drugs, your employer (or even a potential employer) may have 
access to the details of your medication history. If all this information is consolidated, 
the result is a fairly complete electronic record of your day, available both for sale and 
purchase by others. A novel niche market has even developed whereby professional 
researchers will search online databases and the Internet to compile a dossier of personal 
information in response to requests from those interested in as much detail on others as 
possible, such as current and potential employers.
Perhaps the greatest threat to personal privacy in the commercial sector comes from 
a rather recent development, which is the use of pooled customer information by 
companies for marketing purposes. Companies have always collected detailed 
information about their customers in the form of transaction histories, but have only 
recently begun to consolidate transaction histories in data warehouses and to adopt 
sophisticated analytical techniques of “data mining” to identify trends and buying 
patterns that will provide them with a competitive edge. Companies soon learned that 
they could compile even more comprehensive information through the use of 
centralised reward programs, such as air miles, which provide them with a more 
complete data picture of consumer habits. Consumers who take advantage of rewards 
programs may not be aware that their statistical history is available to each and every 
commercial sponsor of the program, and that currently no legislation exists which 
would prevent the sponsors from selling this personal information to others. At present, 
no clear ethical or legal line has been drawn to distinguish between appropriate methods 
of data collection and analysis for marketing purposes, and excessive data collection 
that amounts to an unacceptable level of surveillance of the private lives of individuals. 
While information concerning an individual transaction may not pose much of a threat, 
most consumers would no doubt be somewhat unsettled to know that companies are 
compiling a complete statistical history of their consumer transactions over extended
time periods, and that they have no control over the manner in which companies use or 
distribute this information.
Privacy, National Security and Domestic Law Enforcement
The right to privacy is not absolute in that, in most domestic legal systems, the right 
must give way to a countervailing public interest in safety and security. Constitutional 
democracies such as Canada and the United States typically implement a prior 
authorization procedure whereby law enforcement and national security personnel are 
subject to strict due process requirements before a breach of privacy will be permitted. 
Authorities responsible for both domestic and international security, however, are 
increasingly concerned that criminals and terrorists can take advantage of technological 
developments to shield their communications and activities from surveillance. Private 
individuals, on the other hand, while concerned with public safety, also have a strong 
interest in limiting the manner in which the state can use surveillance technology on its 
citizens.
An essentia] component of the privacy of electronic information is the ability to 
keep the data secure from unauthorised access. Just as information in paper-based files 
and documents is kept secure in a physical medium through the use of locks, the 
security of information in an electronic communications medium such as the Internet 
can be protected by cryptographic methods which mathematically scramble the original 
text. Cryptography protects the confidentiality of information by using “digital keys”, 
a unique combination of ones and zeros that an individual can use to encrypt and 
decrypt digital data. Without access to the correct key, data encrypted to ensure 
confidentiality can only be decrypted by the use of “brute force” decoding techniques 
whereby all possible permutations of the key must be tried. Cryptographic strength is 
therefore relative to the length of the cryptographic key. In July 1997, it took 78,000 
computers working together on the Internet 96 days to crack a message encrypted with 
DES (the Data Encryption Standard), a key algorithm that uses a 56-bit key.
Prior to the advent of individual access to global communications networks such 
as the Internet, cryptography policy and technology were almost exclusively of interest 
to governments. Ciyptography was used to protect military secrets and national 
security, and the current Canadian policy and legal framework reflects this orientation. 
Canada is a signatory, along with 33 other nations, to the Wassenaar Arrangement that 
was established to address regional and international security concerns with respect to 
the buildup of weapons of mass destruction and sensitive technology with military
applications.22 The provisions of the Arrangement require states to adopt export 
controls on a long use of “dual-use” products, including cryptography technology. 
Canada has implemented these provisions in the form of export control regulations 
which restrict the export of customised encryption software or hardware. The export 
of mass-marketed encryption software is unrestricted, however, and there are no 
constraints on the import or domestic use of cryptographic software.
While the original focus of cryptographic policy may have been on national and 
international security and the threat of force from other states, a more pressing concern 
these days is the insistence by law enforcement authorities and national security 
agencies in both Canada and the United States that access to strong ciyptography in the 
hands of individuals threatens public safety by limiting the surveillance capacity of the 
state over criminals and terrorists. In the United States, the Clinton Administration 
advanced what was known as the “Clipper Chip” proposal, a government-imposed 
encryption standard that would be embedded in all new forms of communications 
technology and would enable law enforcement authorities to have unlimited access to 
private communications, subject presumably to due process guarantees. Widespread 
opposition from both the public and the technology industry led to the defeat of the 
proposal.
While universal state access to technology used in private communications may no 
longer be a live issue in the United States, the surveillance capacity of law enforcement 
authorities continues to expand in an ad hoc fashion. In the 1980s, Congress 
determined that the legal protection of privacy had not kept pace with technology, and 
concluded that without statutory protection for rapidly expanding wireless and digital 
communication technologies such as e-mail, citizens faced a steady erosion of their 
privacy rights. Accordingly, in 1986, Congress enacted the ECPA, discussed above in 
relation to online privacy, prohibiting interception and disclosure of “electronic 
communications”.
In response to FBI concerns, however, that technological developments were 
impending law enforcement’s electronic surveillance capabilities, Congress 
subsequently enacted the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
(“CALEA”), which generally requires a telecommunications carrier to ensure that its 
equipment, facilities or services are capable of interception pursuant to lawful 
authorisation and to provide access to call-identifying information.23 In response to
22 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controlsfor Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods 
and Technologies (WA), the first global multilateral arrangement on export controls for 
conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, received final approval by 
33 co-founding countries (including Canada) in July 1996 and began operations in September 
1996.
23 47 U.S.C. §1002(a)( 1)-(4).
CALEA proceedings initiated by an FBI petition, the Federal Communications 
Commission on November 5th, 1998 issued a statement expressing its initial approval 
of the technical requirements proposed by the FBI that would enable law enforcement 
authorities to determine the location of individuals using cellular phones.24
Canada recently initiated a review of its own cryptography policy as part of the 
initiative undertaken by Industry Canada’s Task Force on Electronic Commerce. 
Industry Canada defines electronic commerce as “the conduct of commercial activities 
and transactions by means of computer-based information and communications 
technologies”. The mandate of the Task Force on Electronic Commerce is both to study 
the implications of electronic business practices and to create policy for the so-called 
“information highway”. Its primary objective with respect to privacy issues is to 
develop a national policy for protecting the privacy of personal information while still 
allowing for the flow of information necessary to participate in the global information 
economy.25
In February 1998, the Task Force tabled its report of cryptography policy, “A 
Cryptography Policy Framework for Electronics Commerce -  Building Canada’s 
Information Economy and Society”,26 listing possible scenarios for government 
regulation of cryptography.
Among the proposed alternatives was mandated law enforcement access to 
encrypted communications by prohibiting the use of products without key-recovery or 
key-escrow capabilities. Advocates in support of government restriction on the use of 
encryption technology include the Canadian Association of Police Chiefs, the RCMP, 
CSIS and the Communications Security Establishment, all of which have expressed 
concerns about losing the ability to intercept electronic mail or voice communications 
when conducting investigations. Apparently only a few countries, however, favour the 
development of key-escrow or key-recovery techniques. While unlimited access to 
strong cryptography is thought by some to compromise public safety by placing 
criminals and terrorists beyond the surveillance capacity of law enforcement authorities, 
others feel that key-escrow or key-recovery technology creates an inherent risk of 
unlawful interception of personal communications and financial transactions data, 
including the potential for unlawful access by state authorities.
On October 1, 1998, Minister of Industry, the Honourable John Manley, announced 
Canada’s revised ciyptography policy as an essential component of the Canadian
24A formal Notice, including the requisite request for public comment, was released on November 
5, 1998. The Commission rejected other capabilities requested by the Bureau and deferred 
decisions on other issues, including surveillance of Internet communications.
25 Information on the Task Force is available on the Internet at http://e-com.ic.gc.ca
26 The Policy is available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/crypto.
Electronic Commerce Strategy, designed by the federal government to position Canada 
as a world leader in the use of electronic commerce by the year 2000. The policy 
allows Canadians to develop, import and use whatever cryptography products they 
wish, and does not impose any mandatory key-recovery requirements or licensing 
regime. It appears that the government is seeking a balanced approach that will 
encourage the growth of electronic commerce while maintaining the capacity of law 
enforcement and national security agencies to ensure public safety. To this end, the 
government is proposing amendments to the Criminal Code and other statutes as 
necessary to deter the use of encryption in the commission of a crime, and to apply 
existing interception, search and seizure procedures to cryptographic situations and 
circumstances.27
Regulatory Diversity and the Necessity o f Cooperation
In the current global communications environment, one can discern extensive regulatory 
diversity as states adopt different approaches to protecting the privacy of online 
personal information and the security of financial transactions. Each state will impose 
a regulatory burden on the private sector which is sufficient to achieve its own domestic 
welfare objectives in terms of balancing the right of privacy against the requirements 
of commercial activity for the free flow of information and the occasional but important 
need to breach personal privacy in order to protect public safety. Given the exigencies 
of international trade and finance, however, in combination with the decentralised 
nature of Internet communications, the question becomes whether regulatory arbitrage 
will result in a global standard of privacy being set at the level of the lowest net 
regulatory burden. In a classic “race to the bottom” scenario, states which initially pose 
a high net regulatory burden will be unable to maintain a position of comparative 
advantage in international trade and finance unless they decrease the available level of 
privacy protection to the standard of the lowest common denominator.
The first mover in the international arena in this area is the European Union. 
Europeans have benefited to a much greater degree than North Americans from strict 
and comprehensive privacy laws which protect personal information regardless of 
whether it is collected by the public or private sector. In contrast, in both Canada and 
the United States privacy legislation generally applies only to the public sector. What 
protection is available in the private sector is largely sectoral or self-regulatory rather 
than legislative in nature. The informal regulatory approach to the protection of 
personal privacy found in both the Canadian and U.S. systems, however, may soon be 
required to give way to more substantive measures in the face of increasing 
international economic pressure resulting from the provisions of the European Union’s
27 Information on Canada’s cryptography policy is available on the Internet at http://e- 
com.ic.gc.ca/english/fastfacts/43d7.htm.
Data Protection Directive which took effect on October 25th, 1998.28 The Directive is 
intended to protect personal privacy by prohibiting the improper collection^ use and 
transfer of data relating to individuals. For EU member countries, the effect of the 
Directive is to harmonise the flow of cross-border information between member 
countries, replacing the previous confusing and conflicting standards imposed by 
multiple regulations and procedures.
The data law sets a standard of legal rights for EU citizens which far exceeds the 
level of protection accorded to either Americans or Canadians at this time. Article 25 
of the Directive establishes rules to ensure that personal data is transferred to countries 
outside the EU only when the continued protection of the data is guaranteed, thus 
ensuring that the high standards of privacy protection introduced by Directive are not 
undermined. As a result, many U.S. or Canadian companies with European operations, 
or with significant trade relationships with European companies, could find their 
commercial activities disrupted. Depending on the economic strength of the EU in 
international trade and financial services, and the strength of its commitment to 
enforcement, the potential for regulatory arbitrage could be greatly reduced if other 
states respond by raising their own levels of privacy protection accordingly.
The EU has provided a safety valve, however, which takes into account the 
necessity of avoiding massive disruptions to commerce or initiating a trade war with 
strong trading partners such as the United States. While the basic rule of Article 25 is 
that data should only be transferred to a non-EU country if it will be adequately 
protected in the destination location, adequacy does not necessarily require a non-EU 
country to apply legislation similar to the EU Directive. In addition, Article 26 provides 
a practical system of exemptions and special conditions. Data transfer will be allowed 
to countries without adequate protection in given circumstances, such as when the data 
subject has consented to the transfer, or if the transfer is necessary for the performance 
of a contract between the data subject and the transferring entity. Aware of the 
international economic implications of the Directive and its possible adverse effect on 
international trade and finance, the Commission is involved in discussions with a 
number of non-EU countries in order to explore methods of avoiding possible 
interruptions in the flow of information. The U.S. Department of Commerce and the 
European Commission have discussed creating a “safe harbour” for U.S. companies that 
voluntarily adhere to certain privacy principles, based on the 1980 OECD Privacy 
Guideline.29
28 “Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data”, Official Journal o f  the European Communities of 23 Nov1995, No. L. 281, p. 31.
29 The text of the Guidelines is available at the OECD website at http://www.oecd.org.
Canada appears to have initiated reform of its own legislative framework much 
earlier than the United States. In May 1996, the Minister of Industry announced that 
the federal government would develop legislation to protect personal information in the 
private sector. This commitment was reiterated by the Minister of Justice in September 
1996. In January 1998, Industry Canada and the Department of Justice released a 
consultation paper entitled “The Protection o f Personal Information -  Building 
Canada's Information Economy and Society”, and solicited comments from the public.30 
Finally, on October 1st, 1998, the Honourable John Manley, Minister of Industry, 
supported by the Minister of Justice and Attorney-General of Canada, the Honourable 
Anne McLellan, introduced a new privacy legislation bill titled The Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. The bill contains measures to 
protect personal information in the private sector, as well as creating an electronic 
alternative for doing business with the federal government and clarifying the assessment 
of the reliability of electronic records used as evidence.31
The privacy provisions are based on the Canadian Standards Associations Model 
Code for the Protection ofPersonal Information, recognised as a national standard in 
1996.32 They address the manner in which organisations collect and disclose personal 
information, the requirement to seek consent of the individual concerned, the right of 
individuals to have access to personal information collected by others, and the right to 
have information about themselves corrected if necessary. The provisions will initially 
apply to the federally-regulated private sector, as well as trade in personal information 
that occurs inter-provincially or internationally. Three years after coming into force, 
the regulations will apply more broadly to all personal information collected, used or 
disclosed in the course of commercial activities. In circumstances where a province 
adopts legislation that is substantially similar to federal regime, as is the case with 
Quebec’s existing privacy law, the organisations covered will be exempted from 
application of federal law.
Some might argue that the application Article 25 of the European Directive results 
in an illegitimate extraterritorial application of national privacy laws, but it would 
appear that the reality of integrated global communications is that a rough 
harmonisation process is inevitable. Strongly held legal values are exported through a
30The publication is available on the Internet at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/pv01169e.html.
31 Bill C-54, An Act to support and promote electronic commerce by protecting personal 
information that is collected, used or disclosed in certain circumstances, by providing for the use 
o f electronic means to communicate or record information or transactions and by amending the 
Canada Evidence Act, the Statutory Instruments Act and the Statute Revision Act, 1 st Sess., 36th 
Pari., 1997-98.Information on the bill is available on the Task Force’s website at http://e- 
com.ic.gc.ca/english/releases/41 d7.htm.
32 The text of the Model Code is available from the Canadian Standards Association, Document 
No.CSA Q83096.
combination of first-mover status, political consultation, and at times,, economic 
leverage. Multilateral give-and-take will eventually result in the progressive 
development of international privacy norms. The beginnings of an international 
consensus among Western states is evidenced by the results of the recent OECD 
Ministerial Conference held in Ottawa in October 1998. The Ottawa Conference was 
the second major international meeting within the overall OECD effort on electronic 
commerce. One of the outcomes of the meeting was Ministered Declaration on 
Protection o f Privacy on Global Networks .33 While the Declaration sets a tone that is 
more aspirational than obligatory in encouraging states to work in tandem with the 
private sector on privacy issues, it nonetheless reaffirms the importance of privacy 
protection and the original principles contained in the 1980 OECD Privacy Guidelines.
Conclusion
Recent developments in global communications technology, particularly the Internet, 
have significant implications for the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and 
privacy. The decentralised nature of the global communications infrastructure presents 
both a challenge and an opportunity to states as they seek to integrate diverse cultural 
values and regulatory regimes to address the legal issues involved in protecting these 
fundamental civil rights in an online environment.
Technology alone does not change the nature of the balance between the competing 
interests of freedom of speech and protection from harm. Instead, the challenge is to 
achieve some degree of regulatory control over a global medium. The Internet’s 
decentralised infrastructure frustrates traditional regulatory options, as communications 
which are prohibited locally may nonetheless be accessed and disseminated in another 
jurisdiction. While Western democracies deal with the jurisdictional challenges in 
attempting to preserve domestic trade-offs between liberty and equality in terms of 
freedom of speech in online environments, it cannot be forgotten that for many of the 
world’s population, access to the Internet may be the first opportunity to speak freely 
to a wide audience. Nor can it be forgotten that the increased pace of global 
technological development threatens to leave behind those nations without the resources 
to build the necessary communications infrastructure. It would appear that existing 
stakeholders in the Internet environment should do everything in their power to 
encourage universal international participation in global communications technology.
The advent of electronic commerce has created a significant threat to personal 
privacy both in Canada and the United States. Privacy legislation covering the public 
sector must somehow be extended appropriately to cover commercial activities in the 
private sector. The sheer volume of personal information contained in commercial data
33 The text of the Declaration is available at the OECD website at http://www.oecd.org.
warehouses places consumers under a form of “creeping surveillance” which may 
breach individual rights of privacy. Not only must the fundamental civil right of 
privacy be protected as a constitutional guarantee, but in practical terms, privacy 
protection is also essential to foster the growth of electronic commerce. For countries 
such as the United States which have yet to take the necessary steps to address privacy 
and security of information in the private sector, the pull of an international consensus 
within the context of global communications and international trade may soon alter 
domestic policy. Global communications and electronic commerce have initiated a 
multilateral dialogue that cannot be ignored, no more than John Donne’s observation 
several hundred years ago can be forgotten.
